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COMMENTS
EVOLUTIONS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
AND STANDARDS FOR THE IMPOSITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A relatively simple statement in the eighth amendment forbids the gov-
ernment from utilizing "cruel and unusual" methods of punishment.' This
seemingly innocuous prohibition has resulted in considerable consternation
when its applicability to the death penalty has been asserted. Historically,
the United States Supreme Court avoided direct confrontation with this
issue by upholding the constitutionality of death penalty cases on issues not
specifically related to whether the punishment of death was per se "cruel
and unusual." In the landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia,2 however, it
held for the first time that the death penalty, as it was then being adminis-
tered, was "cruel and unusual" and consequently a violation of the eighth
amendment. Since this 1972 opinion, the Court has made a number of rul-
ings concerning the constitutionality of capital punishment. In Lockett v.
Ohio,3 the most recent pronouncement on the subject, an attempt was made
to both clarify the confusion resulting from the Furman decision and to re-
fine the standards required to impose a sentence of death.
This Comment will analyze the Supreme Court's numerous decisions re-
garding the eighth amendment and capital punishment. It will discuss the
significant changes and confusion which resulted from Furman and culmi-
nated in the more thorough analysis attempted in Lockett. Finally, the pre-
dominant themes underlying many of the Court's decisions will be analyzed
in an effort to articulate the present state of the law in this area.
I. ANALYSIS OF "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL" AND
ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE DEATH PENALTY
To understand thoroughly the diversity of opinion concerning the issue of
capital punishment, it is imperative to comprehend the constitutional defini-
tion of the term "cruel and unusual." Historically, the cruel and unusual
punishment doctrine has not been well developed. No one test has been
applied consistently, nor has the phrase "cruel and unusual" been precisely
defined. 4
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII reads as follows:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
4. In several opinions, the Court has acknowledged that the definition is imprecise and the
exact scope of the phrase has never been defined. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99
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The Supreme Court's primary concentration has been on the word "cruel"
when determining what punishments are prohibited. The attempt at a defi-
nition for "unusual" has led to a number of diverse interpretations. For
example, "unusual" signifies something different from that which is generally
doneS: penalties are unusual if they are imposed very rarely6; innovative
punishments are not unusual if they are no more cruel than those which
supersede them 7; and all extreme and barbarous penalties are unusual re-
gardless of how infrequently they are imposed." Similarly, on the general
question of what constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment, the Supreme
Court, although ruling a number of times on the subject, has developed no
comprehensive theory with regard to the eighth amendment. Several
themes, however, run through the cases. The four main principles are: (1)
the punishment must not be inherently cruel; (2) it must not be dispropor-
tionate to the offense charged; (3) it must not be an affront to the concept of
human dignity; and (4) any definition of "cruel and unusual" must comport
with the Court's conception of public opinion regarding cruelty. While these
themes have been consistently recognized by the Supreme Court, the
reasons given for applying them in specific cases have often been inconsis-
tent.
Inherent Cruelty
If a punishment is deemed to be cruel, then ipso facto it is a violation of
the eighth amendment. The question, therefore, obviously centers on what
sorts of practices will be considered by the courts to be cruel. The Supreme
Court has attempted a definition of this elusive term by striving to describe
what kinds of punishments are inherently cruel. In accordance with this ef-
fort, the Court has used such phrases as "something inhumane and barba-
rous, something which inflicts a lingering death" 9 and "punishments of torture"
or "unnecessary cruelty." 10 It has never, however, defined unnec-
essary cruelty nor has it indicated whether in reality it can be distinguished
from torture. Public shooting" and electrocution 12 have been held not to
(1958). See also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878), in which the Court stated:
"Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional
provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted." It is sig-
nificant to note that Justice Brennan asserted that the Wilkerson statement remains true today.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S, 238, 258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
5. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 n.32 (1958).
6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 390 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
9. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
10. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
11. Id. at 130. Wilkerson was "charged with wilful, malicious, and premeditated murder"
and was found guilty. Id. He was then sentenced to "be taken from [your] place of confinement
to some place within this district and that you there be publicly shot until you are dead." Id. at
131.
12. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). Kemmler was found guilty of murder in the first
degree. His sentence was to have "a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death"
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constitute unnecessary cruelty because they are instantaneous and painless
methods of execution. 13 The Court has even held 14 that a second electrocu-
tion, when the first attempt failed due to mechanical difficulty, did not con-
stitute unnecessary pain. 15 The rationale was that some pain could be con-
stitutional if it was not inflicted for inhumane reasons. 16
The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that some penalties are inher-
ently cruel in all cases, regardless of the purpose of the punishment. This
type of punishment has been defined primarily by example, specifically in-
cluding disembowlment, public dissection, buring alive, 17 crucifixion, and
"breaking at the wheel." 18 Such judicial statements clearly indicate that the
tortures practiced during the Stuart reign in England, which the Framers
definitely intended to forbid, 19 are per se unconstitutional. This concept of
inherently cruel punishment, though, has been expanded to include political
punishments as well, a development probably not anticipated by the Fram-
ers. In one instance, 20 denationalization was held to be prohibited by the
eighth amendment as being a punishment more primitive than torture. The
Court reasoned that this punishment "destroys for the individual the political
existence that was centuries in the development . . . [and] strips the citizen
pass through his body "and that the application of such current of electricity be continued until
he .. .be dead .... Id. at 441.
13. The degree of physical pain involved in all methods of execution is questionable. Death
by electrocution and shooting are often by no means instantaneous and may be extraordinarily
painful. See Gottlieb, Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 268 (1961).
14. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). The defendant, Willie Fran-
cis, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by electrocution. However, when the time
came for the execution "[t]he executioner threw the switch but, presumably because of some
mechanical difficulty, death did not result." Id. at 460. He was then returned to prison while
his appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
15. Id. at 464. The dissenting opinion noted that, in this case, electrocution was not instan-
taneous and painless and anything other than one continuous application of electricity would be
unnecessarily cruel. (d. at 474-76. The majority opinion did not delineate where the line would
be drawn in which a certain number of successive attempts would be prohibited.
16. Id. at 464. This rationale was also used in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1870), where
the Court asserted that although a punishment such as electrocution may be considered "un-
usual" because of its novelty, it is not inherently cruel if the legislature enacted it for a humane
purpose. Id. at 447.
17. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878). For an interesting discussion of the history
of certain types of punishment, and an analysis of the present forms of punishment and the
eighth amendment, see Gardner, Executions and Indignities-An Eighth Amendment Assess-
ment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L. J. 96 (1978).
18. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).
19. See generally M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAP-
ITAL PUNISHMENT 46-47 (1973); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted" The
Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). Until the twentieth century, the cruel and
unusual punishment clause was hardly ever involved in the courts because the "barbarities" of
Stuart England were not used in America. During the nineteenth century, commentators as-
sumed the clause had become obsolete, particularly since attempts to extend the meaning of the
clause to cover punishments that were disproportionate to crimes had been rebuffed. See also
Note, What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1910).
20. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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of his status in the national and international political community." 2' In
short, the citizen loses his right to have rights. This rationale apparently
broadened the concept of inherent cruelty because it moved beyond a con-
cern with extreme lingering physical pain, emphasizing instead political and
psychological stresses.2 2
This analysis simplifies the categories or types of punishments which are
impermissible. Rather, it deals with the nature and kind of punishments
which are unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has also held, though, that
the extent of the punishment inflicted may be the determinative factor as to
whether or not it is cruel.
Proportionality
Closely analogous to the theory that a punishment in itself can be too
severe and therefore unconstitutional is the idea that a punishment may be
prohibited by the eighth amendment if it is excessive in degree. The Su-
preme Court first encountered this issue in a case in which a prison sen-
tence of over fifty years for the illegal sale of liquor was held not to violate
the constitution. 2 3  Although the majority did not address the eighth
amendment question, the dissent asserted that the inhibition of the eighth
amendment is directed "against all punishments which by their excessive
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offense charged." 24
In Weems v. United States,2 5 the Court was presented with a factual situa-
tion which enabled it directly to decide the constitutionality of excessive
21. Id. at 101.
22. This reasoning conflicts with the Resweber opinion in which the Court rejected the
notion that undergoing a second impending electrocution would be unconstitutional mental
cruelty. "'The situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is just as though he had suf-
fered the identical amount of mental anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such
as, for example, a fire in the cell block." Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
464 (1947). It is strange that the Court considers the mental suffering in loss of citizenship
excessive cruelty but not the fear and distress of a man who knows he is about to be killed.
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter asked in dissent: "[i]s constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that
it can be seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?" Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 125 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
23. O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
24. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting).
25. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Weems Court did not delineate how a court should decide
whether a punishment is excessive. Perhaps this is one reason why courts have been reluctant
to apply the proportionality precept reflected in Weems. Many commentators have bemoaned
the lack of attention given by the courts to the application of the proportionality theory. See,
e.g., Packer, Making the Punishment Fit The Crime, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1074 (1964);
Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 846, 848 (1961).
However, one court has revived the proportionality theory in Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d
1288 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 993 (1975). Downey was found guilty of violat-
ing an Ohio statute which prohibited possession of marijuana for sale. It was Downey's first
drug-related offense and very small amounts of marijuana were involved. He received 10 to 20
years for possession with intent to sell and 20 to 40 years for the actual sale. The Court held
354
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punishment. In that case, a public official in the Phillipines had been con-
victed of falsifying an official document to conceal the wrongful disposition of
a small sum of money. He was fined and sentenced to fifteen years of cadena
temporal, a punishment which consisted of hard labor and constant en-
chainment. Additionally, he was subjected to continual surveillance and a
loss of civil rights. Noting that even the minimum punishment for Weem's
offense was twelve years of cadena, the Court held that the sentence was
cruelly excessive in relation to the crime committed. After comparing the
sanctions likely to be imposed for similar crimes in the United States, the
Court asserted that justice demands that a punishment "should be graduated
and proportioned to the offense." 26  The Weems Court also stated that the
standard of excessiveness articulated in its opinion applied not only to the
proportionality between the punishment and the crime, but also to the se-
verity of the penalty necessary to achieve the proper purposes of punish-
ment.
27
If the purpose of the punishment is inappropriate, then the degree of the
punishment may be irrelevant; even non-excessive punishment is a violation
of the eighth amendment if it is imposed to sanction behavior deemed not
to be criminal in nature. In Robinson v. California,28 the defendant was
convicted under a California statute making it illegal to be addicted to narcot-
ics. The majority found drug addiction to be an illness and held, therefore,
that any punishment would be prohibited. 29  The punishment of ninety days
imprisonment was not thought to be excessive punishment in terms of in-
flicting an undue physical or mental burden. Nonetheless, the Robinson
Court stated: "'[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
3 0
that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime, in violation of the eighth amendment. The
Downey majority based its holding on a comparison with sentences for the same offenses in
other jurisdictions, a comparison with sentences for more violent crimes in Ohio, the legislative
purpose the Ohio statute intended to further and evolving concepts of justice and penology. Id.
at 1292. For further discussion of this case, see Note, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-
Appellate Sentence Review, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 655. See also Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp.
444 (W.D. Va. 1977), where it was held that 40 years imprisonment and $20,000 in fines on
conviction of marijuana charges was grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.
26. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
27. Id. at :381.
28. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
29. The evil in this case was punishing Robinson for his addiction, a status rather than an
act. The Court noted that narcotic addiction was an illness that could be contracted innocently
or involuntarily and criminal sanctions for other illnesses such as leprosy, venereal disease or
mental illness would also be prohibited. Id. at 666-67.
30. Id. at 667. Despite the Robinson Court's ruling that the imposition of criminal sanctions
for the mere status of being a narcotics addict was unconstitutional, the Court ruled in Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), that it is not cruel and unusual punishment to impose criminal
sanctions upon a person for being found intoxicated in a public place. The Court acknowledged
the Robinson holding, but reasoned that Powell was being punished for his "act" of public
drunkenness and not his "status" of alcohol addiction. Therefore, criminal sanctions could be
1979]
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Excessiveness is, therefore, a factor in the consideration of whether a
punishment is cruel. The concept of excessiveness may be considered in
relation either to the extent of the punishment or to the appropriateness of
imposing sanctions on the defendant's activity. This idea of excessiveness,
moreover, is clearly inherent in the definition of cruel.
The Concept of Human Dignity
A punishment may not fall into a particular category deemed to be inher-
ently cruel, and it may not necessarily be excessive for the crime charged,
but nonetheless it may be deemed "cruel and unusual" if it affronts the basic
concepts of human dignity. This concept appears as a consistent theme in
eighth amendment cases. The Court has stated that "[t]he basic concept un-
derlying the eighth amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man," 3 1
a purpose which illegitimates punishments intended to destroy, deny or de-
grade the humanity of a criminal.
This theme is comparable to the first definition of "inherent cruelty," but
the distinction here seems to center on the difference between specifically
enumerated prohibitions and a theoretical framework of unacceptable
punishments. Many of the cases dealing with these concepts, however, in-
tertwine the analysis and jumble the distinctions. Although the Supreme
Court has been in general agreement that punishments which affront human
dignity violate the eighth amendment, it has not clearly defined the
perimeters of "decency." 32 While the Court has asserted that various forms
used to deter such anti-social conduct and a fine of fifty dollars was held not to be dispropor-
tionate to the "crime" of public drunkenness even if the drunkenness was due to chronic al-
coholism. Poweil v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968).
In contrast, the dissenting opinion was premised on the disease concept of alcoholism-that
the defendant was powerless to avoid the forbidden behavior and criminal penalties could not
be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition which he was powerless to change. Id. at
567-68 (Fortas, J., dissenting). If chronic alcoholism is a disease like drug addiction, any distinc-
tion between Robinson and Powell is certainly questionable. For an analysis of Robinson and
Powell, see Tao, Criminal Drunkenness and the Law, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1059 (1969). In examin-
ing medical theories on the disease concept of alcoholism, one commentator has noted that
there are probably as many psychological theories set forth to explain alcoholism as there are
systematic psychological theories. Id. at 1062. For a more recent analysis of the debate of
alcoholism as a disease, see Davies, Is Alcoholism Really a Disease?, 3 CONTEMP. DRUG 197
(1974).
An alternative defense to the disease concept of alcoholism has been the defense of involun-
tariness, since the criminal law doctrine of actus reus requires voluntary conduct for criminal
responsibility. See Tao, Psychiatry and the Utility of Traditional Criminal Approach to Drunk-
enness Offenses, Symposium-Psychiatry and Treatment, 57 CEO. L. J. No. 4 (1969); Com-
ment, Criminal Law: Chronic Alcoholism as a Defense to Crime, 61 MINN. L. REV. 901 (1977).
31. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
32. For example, in Weems the Court spoke of "decency" when it determined that a
punishment may be so aberrational as to violate standards of decency more or less universally
accepted. Additionally, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the dis-
senters asserted that anything other than death by one continuous application of electricity




of torture affront human dignity, the punishment of death itself has never
been considered inhumane.3 3 Moreover, the existence of a humane pur-
pose behind the punishment of death has been found to save it from the
category of "cruel and unusual" punishment. Apparently, if the purpose of
any given sanction is not to inflict unnecessary pain, it will comport with the
concept of respecting human dignity.3 4
This theory is extremely elusive and seemingly predicated on a predeter-
mined definition of "dignity." Although this premise has never been articu-
lated by the Court, it nonetheless is a pervasive rationale which on several
occasions has been utilized to invalidate certain punishments. The fact that
the Court will look to the purpose behind the punishment, however, indi-
cates the extremely subjective nature of this concept. Further, the Court's
silence has rendered the concept so vague and uncertain that the inevitable
result has been a determination of each case on an ad hoc basis.
Public Opinion
The term "cruelty," as defined thus far, would be incomplete without a
discussion of the method the Court utilizes to ascertain the boundaries of the
concept. Public opinion has played a significant role in determinations of
whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual. ' 3'  The Court has often ex-
pressed its view that the eighth amendment must be interpreted in terms
of a changing society. This means that it will look not only to the Framer's
intent, but also to the "evolving standards of decency which mark the prog-
ress of a maturing society." 3 6
The Supreme Court has also used this changing social mores concept in
ruling against punishments which were not in the traditional "torture" cate-
gory. Public opinion, however, has also been used for the opposite purpose.
Relying on the more static level of minimum social tolerances, the Court has
justified upholding certain traditional punishments because they have en-
joyed the public support throughout history. This factor, for example, was
33. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
446 (1890). See alao note 17 and accompanying text supra.
34. Although the perimeters of unnecessary cruelty within this context have not been de-
fined, it is clear that instantaneous and painless methods of execution are not an affront to
dignity. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443-44, (1890). However, in Resweber, a second elec-
trocution was not instantaneous and painless, but the Court nevertheless upheld it, noting that
there was no inhumane purpose in inflicting the unnecessary pain.
35. The Court has cited both contemporary American values to support its prohibition of
certain punishments and historical values to support its validation of certain punishments.
36. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). In Weems, the Court noted that the cruel and
unusual punishment clause was not fastened to the obsolete, but could acquire an expansive
meaning as "public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). The Supreme Court has used this changing social mores
concept to support its invalidation of punishments that are inherently cruel and/or an affront to
human dignity (Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 329, 349 (1910)), and punishments that are
disproportionate to the offense (Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
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stated as one reason for the approval of public shooting as a method of
execution. 37 Likewise, the Court has implicitly upheld capital punishment
by stating that "the death penalty has been employed throughout our history
and in a day where it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the
constitutional concept of cruelty." 3 8
In contrast, at other times the Court has ignored historical usage when
invalidating punishments as "cruel and unusual." In Weems, it ignored the
historical usage of the penalty of cadena temporal, which had been tradition-
ally used in the Phillipines.2 9 In Robinson, the Court also ignored public
consent to a punishment supported by historical usage, going so far as to
state: "California was not the only state to treat mere addiction as criminal;
punishment as a social response to disease has ancient antecedents." 40
It becomes apparent that the public opinion rationale is not a "test" for
the determination of what constitutes cruelty. It is more appropriately
termed a justification for the Court's more subjective interpretation of the
cruelty question. The definitional aspects center on the first three principles,
with the "public opinion" doctrine acting as a source of enrichment for the
basis of the opinion. As was noted previously, these various definitions occur
consistently in eighth amendment cases. They obviously are not clear cut
and at some points they seem to converge on a sense of the "dignity of
man." This lack of cohesiveness is not limited to the definitional aspects of
the eighth amendment; the decisions regarding the death penalty also fail
with regard to consistency.
37. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878). The Court observed that the firing
squad had been used in the Utah Territory for at least a quarter of a century and is still in use
by the Army. Id. at 133.
38. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). Yet it is ironic that in the same case, the Court
ignored historical and contemporary American values and examined the statute books of other
civilized nations to support its holding that denationalization was cruel and unusual. Id. at
102-03. See, e.g., Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83
HARV. L. REv. 1773 (1970).
39. The Court stated that "[tihere are degrees of homicide that are not punished so se-
verely" in America and that Weems' punishment would amount to no more than a large fine
here. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 ('1910).
40. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962). In fact, one commentator has noted
that the punishment of addicts was less widely authorized than the death penaly at the time,
but more so than any punishment theretofore struck down by the Court under the eighth
amendment. See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 38, at 1782. The Court's rulings in Weems
and Robinson seem to suggest that the Supreme Court will ignore traditional values if it chooses
to invalidate a certain punishment.
It is interesting to note that in Robinson the Supreme Court did not justify striking down the
statute because of disapproval exemplified by contemporary American standards or the stan-
dards of other civilized nations. Rather, it asserted that the public, if fully informed, would
condemn it. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). This assertion suggests that the
Supreme Court believed that its opinion was a more reliable factor in determining whether a
punishment would violate the eighth amendment than uninformed public opinion. If this is
true, one can only wonder why public opinion is held as a viable means of evaluation.
[Vol. 28:351
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Death Penalty as Per Se "Cruel and Unusual"
Although the Supreme Court has held certain types of punishments to be
inherently "cruel and unusual," 4 1 before Gregg v. Georgia 42 the Court did
not directly confront the issue of whether capital punishment per se was
unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.4 3  The
Court had numerous opportunities to address the question earlier,,but man-
aged to avoid the problem in a variety of ways. 4  For example, in one
case, 45 the Court limited its grant of certiorari to consideration of the narrow
issue of whether jurors could be excluded because they objected to the
propriety of the death penalty. 46  In another case, the procedural question
of whether juries could have absolute discretion to impose the death penalty
was considered. 47  The Court further avoided the opportunity of resolving
the per se issue by denying certiorari to hear a case 4 in which the death
penalty was imposed upon a convicted rapist who had neither taken nor
endangered human life, and by reversing on other grounds a case which
presented a strong case for a per se ruling on the constitutionality of the
death penalty. 419
This lack of direct validation did not, however, prevent the Court from
implicitly sanctioning capital punishment. Several factors indicated the
Court's acceptance of the death penalty. First, it upheld certain methods of
execution. Public shooting, 50 electrocution 5 ' and even a second electrocu-
41. But see note 26 and accompanying text supra.
42. 428 U.S. 153, 168-69 (1976).
43. The eighth amendment's cruel and unusual clause is fully applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
44. See England, Capital Punishment in the Light of Constitutional Evolution: An Analysis
of Distinctions Between Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 596, 607 (1977).
45. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
46. In Witherspoon, an Illinois statute provided for challenges for cause in murder trials for
jurors who were opposed to capital punishment. The Court held that it was unconstitutional to
exclude jurors who had conscientious scruples against the death penalty, and asserted that a
state may not entrust the determination of whether a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal
organized to convict. Id. at 521-23.
47. MeGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The McGautha Court held that due pro-
cess is not violated if the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is left to the un-
trammeled discretion of the jury.
48. Rudolph v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So.2d 662, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
49. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Boykin had been sentenced to death for simple
robbery. The petitioner argued that the death penalty was per se cruel and unusual and also
offered a narrower theory, that it was at least impermissible for a crime that did not involve a
killing or serious injury. Brief for Petitioner at 8-24, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
The Court reversed on the grounds that the plea was not intelligent and voluntary and made no
reference to the constitutionality of the death penalty.
50. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). Public shooting was upheld as an "instantaneous
and painless" method of execution on the basis of territorial custom and lack of congressional
intent to limit methods of execution. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
51. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). Electrocution was upheld as an acceptable form of
execution if it was enacted by the legislature for a humane purpose. Id. at 447.
1979]
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tion when the first one failed 52 were held to be permissible. Second, the
Court explicitly ruled that capital punishment did not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. 53  Finally, some justices actually
expressed approval of the death penalty in their opinions. In the electrocu-
tion case, In re Kemmler, the majority opinion expressly recognized that the
punishment of death itself was not cruel, since the word "cruel" as used in
the eighth amendment implied "something inhuman and barbarous, some-
thing more than the mere extinguishment of life." 5 4 These cases provided
the "necessary foundation" 55 for the validation of the death penalty as per se
constitutional. Prior decisions had not squarely held that the punishment of
death "does not invariably violate the Constitution." 5 6
II. SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS IN FURMAN
AND THE SUBSEQUENT OPINIONS
After years of taking various approaches to the issue, the Supreme Court
made some breakthrough in its analysis of the constitutionality of capital
punishment in Furman v. Georgia.57  It consolidated three separate cases in
52. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
53. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959). Williams had been charged with murder in
Oklahoma, where he entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. There-
after, he was charged in another Oklahoma court with a kidnapping involved in the same oc-
currence. He was sentenced to death. The Court asserted that the death sentence for kidnap-
ping, which was within the range of punishments authorized for that crime by Oklahoma law
did not violate due process of law. Id. at 586-87.
54. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958), the
plurality stated that the death penalty is not unconstitutionally cruel because it has been
employed throughout history and is still widely accepted. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183 (1971), Justice Black stated "[tihe Eighth Amendment forbids cruel and unusual punish-
ments . . . these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that punishment
was in common use and authorized by law here and in other countries from which our ancestors
came at the time the Amendment was adopted." Id. at 226 (Black, J., concurring).
55. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168 (1976).
56. Id. at 169. Although there was no strong disapproval of capital punishment per se ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court, abolitionists relied on dicta in certain cases to argue its uncon-
stitutionality. For example, in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing), Justice Goldberg asserted that he would have granted certiorari to consider the question of
whether the death penalty could be imposed for the crime of rape. He suggested that it may be
unconstitutional if: (1) it produces hardship disproportionately greater than the harm it seeks to
prevent or; (2) a less severe punishment could as effectively achieve the permissible end of
punishment. However, because of the lack of authoritative statements by the Supreme Court
espousing this view, abolitionists were forced to rely on eighth amendment cases. These hold-
ings did not directly deal with the death penalty but merely presented general constitutional
arguments that could be used against it. Therefore, abolitionists especially used the themes of
unnecessary cruelty and evolving standards of decency.
57. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The legal commentary on Furman has been extensive. See, e.g.,
Junker, The Death Penalty Cases: A Preliminary Comment, 48 WASH. L. REV. 95 (1972);
Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment: Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Wollen,
The Death Penalty After Furman, 4 Lov. CHI. L.J. 339 (1973).
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which the death penalty had been imposed. 58 In one case,5 9 the defendant
had been convicted of murder, while in the other two the accused had been
found guilty of rape.6 0 Certiorari was limited to the specific issue of
whether the death penalty in those cases violated the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment. 61 The case proved to be a
landmark decision because it was held that capital punishment as it was then
being administered was in and of itself "cruel and unusual." 6 2  However,
the per curiam decision, in which the majority expressed differing views as
to the fundamental issues, created much confusion.
Five justices agreed that the punishment of death was unconstitutional. 63
Justices Douglas, Stewart and White did not favor total elimination of capital
punishment, but they believed the discretionary death statutes were "cruel
and unusual" because they were being imposed "capriciously, wantonly and
freakishly." 64  Because the death penalty was being administered in this
manner and because it was being imposed so infrequently, it was found to
have lost any deterrent effect. 65  Also, Justice Douglas believed the penalty
was being imposed in a racially discriminatory fashion. 66  Justices Brennan 6 7
and Marshall 6 8 favored total elimination of the death penalty, but they also
shared the view that its application had been capricious. The single holding
which emerged was that the arbitrary and capricious manner of providing for
capital punishment under statutes which left juries with undirected discre-
tion 69 constituted cruel and unusual punishment and accordingly violated
58. Furman v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969); Jackson v. Georgia, 225 Ga.
790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
59. Furman v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969).
60. Jackson v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d
932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
61. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
62. Id. at 239-40.
63. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall filed opinions invalidating the
death penalty. 408 U.S. 240 (1976).
64. Id. at 309-10.
65. Id. at 312. See Comment, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, 1975 Term], see also Polsby, supra note 57.
66. 408 U.S. 240, 257 (1976) (Douglas, J., concurring).
67. 408 U.S. 240, 305 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. 408 U.S. 240, 358-59 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring).
69. Various problems are associated with jury discretion in capital cases. Juries may refuse
to convict because of some vaguely defined defense asserted as a justification for the defendant's
actions. Juries may choose to convict or acquit because they dislike or like the defendant's
attorney. Moreover, juries may discriminate on the basis of sex, race or the defendant's personal
characteristics. See Gale, S. 1 and the Death Penalty: The Persistence of Discretion, 9 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 251, 299 (1976). For an excellent legal commentary on the historical problems of
jury discretion in death penalty cases, see Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital
Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (1953). After Furman, commentators analyzed the issue of jury
discretion with respect to the mandatory statutes. See, e.g., Gerber, A Death Penalty We Can
Live With, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 251, 268-70 (1974); Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory
Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U.L. REV. 32 (1974).
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the eighth amendment. 70 The Furman opinion left open the important
question of whether the death penalty was unconstitutional per se. Addition-
ally, the Court failed to set guidelines for the enactment of a constitutionally
acceptable death penalty statute. Since Furman, however, the judiciary has
struggled to provide a more definitive statement on the issue.
The post-Furman decisions have attempted to formulate a more concise
pronouncement regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment. The
subsequent case law has held that death per se is not violative of the eight
amendment, 71 but that its applicability should be limited to cases of mur-
der.72 The Court has also limited the scope of the death penalty by fbrbid-
ding mandatory sentencing statutes 73 and by requiring the use of guided
discretion statutes 74 providing for consideration of both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. 75  Each of these post-Furman decisions will be
analyzed separately so that a clear understanding of the case law may be
achieved. The outer boundaries of constitutional compliance will be initially
discussed, then the cases dealing with the guidelines for permissible inflic-
tion of the death penalty will be presented.
Cruel and Unusual Per Se
In Gregg v. Georgia,76 the Court held that death itself was not necessarily
a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. It made this determination based on a two-part test which
focused on public opinion and the degree of severity of the sentence. First,
it held that capital punishment was not contrary to the "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 77  In support of
this statement, the Court cited the long history of acceptance in this country
of the death penalty and took note of the enactment of new capital punish-
ment statutes subsequent to the Furman decision as well as the apparent
willingness of juries to continue to impose death sentences.
Next, the Court found that capital punishment did not offend the "dignity
of man" because it was not a severe or unnecessary infliction of pain, nor
70. But cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The McGautha Court held that the
due process clause does not require the jury to be provided with guided discretion. Since both
Furman and McGautha concern the procedural aspect of imposing the death penalty, the two
opinions are conflicting.
71. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See Tao, The Constitutional Status of Capital
Punishment: An Analysis of Gregg, Jurek, Roberts and Woodson, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 345
(1977); Comment, Resurrection of Capital Punishment-The 1976 Death Penalty Cases, 81
DICK. L. REv. 543 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
72. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
73. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
74. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
75. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
76. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
77. Id. at 173.
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was it grossly disproportionate to the crime of murder. 78  To determine
whether the sanction imposed was so totally without penological justification
that it resulted in the gratuitous infliction of suffering, the Court discussed
justifiable punishment in terms of social aims of deterrence and retribution.
It invoked judicial restraint by deferring the determination of the factual
question of deterrence to the legislatures' judgment, and further noted in-
conclusiveness of the studies regarding whether capital punishment was in
fact a deterrent to crime. The Court also stated that, although retribution
was no longer the dominant objective in criminal law, capital punishment
might serve as an essential expression of society's moral outrage and was,
therefore, an appropriate response to certain crimes. 79
In Coker v. Georgia,80 however, death was held to be a disproportionate
penalty for rape. It was found to be excessive in eighth amendment terms
because public opinion required such a conclusion. As in Gregg, the Court
cited history arid legislative and jury responses to capital rape cases to sup-
port its conclusion. It noted that at no time in the last fifty years had a
majority of states authorized death as a punishment for rape.8
Unlike Gregg, no reference was made to whether death was an effective
means of retribution to express society's moral outrage. No statement was
made concerning deterrence. The Coker Court merely concluded that the
death penalty was an excessive penalty for a rapist, as opposed to a mur-
derer, because the rapist had not unjustifiably taken a human life. In noting
that the existence of any aggravating circumstances would not effect its con-
clusion, the Court stated: "1]ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over
and normally is not beyond repair." 8 2  When the Coker holding that death
78. Id. at 187. Post-Furman cases also elaborated on the "excessiveness" standard in evaluat-
ing cruel and unusual punishment. In Coker, the Court held that the eighth amendment bars
not only punishments that are "barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in relation to the
crime committed. A punishment is excessive if it: (1) makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
79. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-86 (1976).
80. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
81. Id. at 593-94. In nine out of ten rape convictions in Georgia, juries had not imposed the
death sentence. Id. at 597. One study revealed that in 42 cases of rape, a verdict of guilty on
that charge was rendered three times. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 250,
141 Table 39 (1966). Yet, in this same sample the judges would have convicted the accused of
rape seven times as often. Id. at 253-54 & Table 73. In cases of "aggravated" rape, juries
convicted of the higher offense in 46 out of 64 cases. The judges would have done so in 47
cases. Id. at 252-53 & Table 72. Although this study indicates a reluctance of jurors to render
guilty verdicts in rape cases, consider a jury's reaction to an extreme, socially repugnant situa-
tion. See Florida Jury Recommends Death for Man Convicted of Raping Each of His Three
Daughters, 3 Juv. JUST. Dic. 3 (1975). For further discussion of jurors' reactions to rape vic-
tims, see Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 30 (1977).
82. 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977). But see the concurring opinion in the same case. In response
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is disproportionate for rape because no life has been taken is considered in
conjunction with the Gregg finding that death is not always disproportionate
for murder because murder is an extreme crime suitable to an extreme sanc-
tion, the Court's excessiveness test now appears to be one of a life for a life,
an eye for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth. 83  It remains to be seen, however,
whether this reasoning will be taken to its logical conclusion. The Court has
never stated whether the death penalty would be excessive if imposed on a
defendant found guilty under an accountability theory, but who did not in
fact take a human life.8 4  Consequently, even the outer boundaries of per-
missible use of the death penalty have not been constructively formulated.
Mandatory Sentencing Statutes
Gregg and Coker were concerned with the substantive aspects of when
and for what crimes the death penalty may constitutionally be applied.
Other decisions have also invalidated the death penalty in certain situations,
but in those cases the procedures for imposing the penalty were attacked.
Both North Carolina and Louisiana had reacted to the concern in Furman
over unbridled jury discretion by enacting statutes making the death penalty
mandatory for certain crimes.8 5 The mandatory statutes did not provide for
a bifurcated trial, consideration of mitigating circumstances, or appellate re-
view.86  If during a single trial the jury found the defendant guilty of first-
degree murder, death was the only punishment available. The Supreme
Court held in Woodson v. North Carolina, 7 and Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
to the majority's distinction between the rapist and the murderer, Justice Powell asserted that
"[slome victims are so grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is beyond re-
pair." Id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring).
Women often experience great shame after being raped. Society frequently attaches stigma to
victims of crime, and the rape victim suffers an extreme decrease in status. Because she is
widely regarded as "damaged goods," the woman may view herself as a social leper and develop
a generalized suspicion of men. Her intimate life may deteriorate and her closest relationships
may founder and die. See Berger, supra note 81, at 23. See also COHEN, SUCCUMBING TO
RAPE, RAPE VICTIMOLOGY XV (L. Schultz ed. 1975); Note, The Victim In a Forcible Rape Case:
A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335 (1973).
83. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 621 (1977) (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice Burger con-
cludes that "[t]he clear implication of today's holding appears to be that the death penalty may
be properly imposed only as to crimes resulting in death of the victim." Id.
84. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
85. The post-Furman statutes are listed in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976).
For a detailed analysis of many of these statutes, see Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality
of the Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974).
86. The states which enacted mandatory statutes ignored Justice Douglas' characterization of
jury discretion in Furman as "untrammeled," rather than discretion per se. Discretion is inher-
ent in the criminal justice system and plays an important function. For an analysis of the func-
tion of discretion, see Mackey, supra note 69; Comment, The Supreme Judicial Court and the
Death Penalty: The Effects of Judicial Choice on Legislative Options, 54 B.U.L. REv. 158, 181
(1974); Comment, Capital Punishment after Furman, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 281, 284
(1975).
87. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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Louisiana 88 that these death penalty statutes were unconstitutional. In
Woodson, the Court ruled that the states had misinterpreted Furman by
stating:
While a mandatory death penalty statute may reasonably be expected to
increase the number of persons sentenced to death, it does not fulfill
Furman's basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discre-
tion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally re-
viewable the process for imposing the sentence of death.8 9
Louisiana's mandatory statute made death the penalty for five narrow
categories of first-degree murder, 90 but not for all first-degree murders. The jury
received specific instructions in every first-degree murder case regarding the
elements of second-degree murder and manslaughter and was advised that,
if they did not find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a crime
for a lesser offense could be considered. In view of these guidelines, it is
difficult to discern the rationale behind the Court's finding that the jury's
discretion was "without standards." 91 What then was the specific criticism
of the mandatory approach? In both Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana 92 and
Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana,9 3 the Supreme Court appeared to strike down
the statutes because of the lack of a provision for consideration of mitigating
circumstances. Although the Court clearly ruled that the mandatory ap-
proach was unconstitutional, it is unclear whether it was rejected because
the statutes at issue did not allow for the consideration of those mitigating
circumstances which focused on the individual defendant or because the
mandatory "process" was inherently defective. 94 A clearer understanding of
the Court's intent, however, may be gleaned through an analysis of those
statutes which were upheld.
Guided Discretion Statutes
The Court made clear that the death penalty may be appropriate in some'
cases if certain restrictive guidelines are observed. In Gregg v. Georgia,95
88. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
89. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976). In particular the mandatory ap-
proach was held to be defective because it provides: (1) no standards to guide the jury; (2) no
judiciary check on the arbitrary and capricious exercise of that power through review of death
sentences; and (3) no particular consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of
each convicted defendant. By eliminating consideration of mitigating factors, all persons are
treated as "members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass." Id.
90. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.30 (West 1974).
91. See Tao, supra note 71.
92. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
93. 431 U.S. 6:33 (1977).
94. The plurality in Woodson noted their repudiation of automatic death sentences. Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The fear of jury nullification in capital trials has
been a controversial issue in the recent death penalty cases. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 71,
at 561-62; Note, sunpra note 85, at 1700 n.60.
95. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Proffitt v. Florida," and Jurek v. Texas, 9 7 the Court upheld the respective
states' capital punishment statutes. All three states had attempted to comply
with the Furman decision by providing guidelines for sentencing authorities
to be used when exercising their discretion. A bifurcated trial, 98 in which
the defendant's guilt or innocence initially was to be determined, was com-
mon to all the statutes. If a guilty verdict resulted from the trial phase, a
separate capital-sentencing procedure commenced in which the sentencing
authority could impose either capital punishment or life imprisonment after
hearing pertinent evidence.
Each of the three statutes also provided for review of capital sentences by
the highest state appellate court. In Georgia, a provision requiring the state
supreme court to decide whether each sentence was disproportionate to the
penalties imposed in equivalent cases met with approval by the Court. 99
Under the Texas procedure, the sentencing, it was noted, was reviewable by
appellate courts. Thus, the law sought to assure that the death penalty
would not be imposed in a "wanton or freakish manner." 100 In addition, in
each of the three cases the Court emphasized that the procedures involved
seemed to "focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the
crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant." 101
Both the Georgia1 02 and Florida' 03 statutes provided that, after a finding of
guilt, a hearing had to be held where either side would be able to introduce
evidence of mitigating or aggravating factors. In Georgia, there were ten
specified aggravating circumstances, one of which had to be found to be
present beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty could be im-
posed. 104 However, the actual imposition of the penalty also depended
96. Proffitt v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
97. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
98. Although bifurcated trials are clearly preferred by the Supreme Court in capital cases, it
has held that bifurcated trials per se are not necessary under the due process clause. See
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967).
99. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
100. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
101. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
102. GA. CODE § 27-2503(b) (1975). The Gregg opinion indicated the Court's preference for a
bifurcated process because it is more likely to ensure elimination of the constitutional deficien-
cies identified in Furman. However, the Court explicitly stated that it would not automatically
strike down a statute which did not provide for such a system.
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1976-77).
104. Aggravating circumstances shall include the following:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of
murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assault-
ive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly
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upon a consideration of mitigating factors, 10 5 and the judge was bound by
the jury's choice of the sentence imposed. 10 6 Florida's scheme provided
more explicit guidance concerning factors to be considered by the sentencing
authority. Eight aggravating and seven mitigating circumstances were listed
in the statute. 1(17 The sentencing authority was required to consider these
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of
a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of
his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind,
or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful confinement, of himself or another.
GA. CODE § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1977).
105. GA. CODE. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1977). The Supreme Court relied upon the interpretation
of the Georgia statute given by the Georgia court in Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 865, 213
S.E.2d 829, 832 (1975), that three mitigating factors should be considered by the jury in capital
cases: his youth; the extent of cooperation with the police; and his emotional state at the time of
the crime. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976).
106. GA. CODE §§ 26-3102, 27-2514 (Supp. 1977).
107. Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprison-
ment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after commit-
ting or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1979).
Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
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when determining whether sufficient mitigating circumstances existed to
outweigh those aggravating circumstances found to be present. 10 8
In contrast, capital sentencing procedures in Texas were not nearly as
specific. Under that state's statute, once the determination of guilt had been
made, a separate proceeding was required to determine whether the death
penalty was in order.10 9 At this proceeding, counsel for either side could
present arguments for or against capital punishment, but the statute pro-
vided for no aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Instead, the jury was
asked: (1) whether the defendant acted deliberately and with reasonable ex-
pectation that death would result; (2) whether it was probable that the
defendant would commit violent criminal acts in the future; and (3) whether
the defendant's conduct was an unreasonable response to provocation? If all
of these questions were found beyond a reasonable doubt to be answerable
in the affirmative, the death sentence was imposed. 110
Commentators have noted that the Texas statute appears to set the con-
stitutional minimum for the use of the death penalty. 1 1' The omission of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances was nearly fatal, the Court noting
that a system which allowed only aggravating factors "would approach the
mandatory laws we today hold unconstitutional." 112 The statute was up-
held, though, because the death penalty was only required for "capital mur-
der" cases, and capital murder was defined as murder with malice
aforethought under one of five specified conditions. 113 In so narrowing the
categories, the statute in effect required that there be at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance. Additionally, the Court relied on language used
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domina-
tion of another person.(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. at § 921.141(6).
108. Id. at § 921.141(2). It is significant to note that, unlike the statutes of Georgia and
Texas, the Florida statute does not require the presence of statutory circumstances to be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt.
109. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(b),(c),(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
110. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07(3)(b),(c),(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). See Com-
ment, 1975 Term, supra note 65.
111. See Comment, supra note 71; Comment, 1975 Term, supra note 65.
112. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ch. 19, § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1974). The conditions are as
follows: (1) person murders a peace officer or fireman while acting in his official capacity; (2)
person murders during the attempt or commission of kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated
rape, arson; (3) person murders for remuneration or employs another to do so; (4) person mur-
ders while attempting to escape from a penal institution; (5) person murders an employee of a




by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals which indicated that the defendant
could bring mitigating factors to the jury's attention. 1 4 In 1976, then, the
main difference between those statutes upheld (guided discretion) and those
struck down (mandatory sentencing) seemed to be the bifurcated system and
appellate review. The Texas statute, while not providing statutorily de-
lineated aggravating and mitigating circumstances, did allow for the two-tier
trial and review by a higher court. What seemed to be true, however, was
apparently not the case.
Lockett v. Ohio and Individualized Sentencing
In its most recent decision, the Supreme Court indicated that the pivotal
factor to be considered in death penalty sentencing was whether the defend-
ant was given the opportunity to present evidence of mitigating factors. In
Lockett v. Ohio,115 the Court clarified its position on the subject by stating:
None of the statutes we sustained in Gregg and the companion cases
clearly operated at that time to prevent the sentencer from considering
any aspect of the defendant's character and record or any circumstances of
his offense as an independently mitigating factor. 116
This was the fatal error in Ohio's capital punishment statute. 1 17
In Lockett and its companion case," 8 the Court invalidated the death
penalty because the statutory scheme left little or no room for the considera-
tion of mitigating factors. The statute was similar to those in Gregg, Proffitt,
and Jurek in that it was apparently a direct response by the Ohio legislature
to comply with the Furman decision. 119 Ohio's statute also provided that
114. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976).
115. 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978). See Comment, The Constitutionality of Ohio's Death Penalty, 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 617 (1977).
116. 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2966 (1978).
117. The Court stated that "[t]he limited range of mitigating circumstances which may be
considered by the sentencer under the Ohio statute is incompatible with the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not
preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors." 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2967 (1978).
118. Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978). The defendant, Bell, was also convicted under the
Ohio death penalty statute. He was convicted of aggravated murder committed during a kid-
napping. The evidence showed that Bell and a companion kidnapped a man, placed him in the
trunk of his own car, then drove the car to a cemetary. Bell's companion next went to the
grounds and shot the victim twice. Bell was in the car at the time and stated that he did not
know what his friend was going to do. Consequently he was convicted as an aider and abettor,
and not as the principal felon. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction for the reasons set
forth in Lockett. 98 S. Ct. at 2980-81.
119. The Court admits that the "limits on the consideration of mitigating factors
in Ohio's death penalty statute which Lockett now attacks appear to have been a
direct response to Furman." 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2962 n.7 (1978). For an analysis of the
legislative history for the adoption of the statute, see Lehman & Norris, Some Legis-
lative History and Comments on Ohio's New Criminal Code, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 8 (1974).
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specific aggravating factors must be considered before imposition of the
death penalty would be permitted, 120 but the opportunity to present mitigat-
ing circumstances was severely curtailed. It provided for only three fac-
The Article indicates that after the Furman decision there were four options available
concerning the permissibility of the death penalty: (1) abolish it; (2) retain it and make it man-
datory for specific cases; (3) retain it and let the jury decide whether it should be imposed,
providing specific criteria to guide the jury; or (4) retain the penalty but remove as much
discretion as possible. Id. at 19-20.
120. The statute under which Lockett and Bell were sentenced was OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2929.01-2929.04 (1975 Repl. Vol.). The statute provides in pertinent part:
§ 2929.03 Imposing sentence for a capital offense.
(A) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder con-
tains no specification of an aggravating circumstance listed in division (A) of section
2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge, the
trial court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment of the offender.
(B) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder con-
tains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of
section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the verdict shall separately state whether the
accused is found guilty or not guilty of the principal charge and, if guilty of the
principal charge, whether the offender is guilty or not guilty of each specification.
The jury shall be instructed on its duties in this regard, which shall include an
instruction that a specification must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to support a guilty verdict on such specification, but such instruction shall not men-
tion the penalty which may be the consequence of a guilty or not guilty verdict on
any charge or specification.
(C) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder con-
tains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of
section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then following a verdict of guilty of the charge
but not guilty of each of the specifications, the trial court shall impose sentence of
life imprisonment on the offender. If the indictment contains one or more specifica-
tions listed in division (A) of such section, then, following a verdict of guilty of both
the charge and one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the
offender shall be determined:
(1) By the panel of three judges which tried the offender upon his waiver
of the right to trial by jury;
(2) By the trial judge, if the offender was tried by a jury.
(D) When death may be imposed as a penalty for aggravated murder, the court
shall require a pre-sentence investigation and a psychiatric examination to be made,
and reports submitted to the court, pursuant to section 2947.06 of the Revised
Code. Copies of the reports shall be furnished to the prosecutor and to the offender
or his counsel. The court shall hear testimony and other evidence, the statement, if
any, of the offender, and the arguments, if any, of counsel for the defense and
prosecution, relevant to the penalty which should be imposed on the offender. If
the offender chooses to make a statement, he is subject to cross-examination only if
he consents to make such statement under oath or affirmation.
(E) Upon consideration of the reports, testimony, other evidence, statements of
the offender, and arguments of counsel submitted to the court pursuant to division
(D) of this section, if the court finds, or if the panel of three judges unanimously
finds that none of the mitigating circumstances listed in division (B) of section
2929.04 of the Revised Code is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it
shall impose sentence of death on the offender. Otherwise, it shall impose sentence
of life imprisonment on the offender.
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tors,121 none of which included any personal characteristics or circumstances
relevant to the particular defendant. The factors were relevant only to miti-
gate the circumstances surrounding the offense, not the offender. 1 22  Addi-
§ 2929.04 Criteria for imposing death or imprisonment for a capital offense.
(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless
one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indict-
ment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt:
(1) The offense was the assassination of the president of the United States
or person in line of succession to the presidency, or of the governor or
lieutenant governor of this state, or of the president-elect or vice president-
elect of the United States, or of the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-
elect of this state, or of a candidate for any of the foregoing offices. For
purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if he has been nominated
for election according to law, or if he has filed a petition or petitions accord-
ing to law to have his name placed on the ballot in a primary or general
election, or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary or general
election.
(2) The offense was committed for hire.
(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, ap-
prehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the
offender.
(4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a de-
tention facility as defined in section 2921.0 of the Revised Code.
(5) The offender has previously been convicted of an offense of which the
gist was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, committed prior
to the offense at bar, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct
involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by
the offender.
(6) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer whom the of-
fender knew to be such, and either the victim was engaged in his duties at
the time of the offense, or it was the offender's specific purpose to kill a law
enforcement officer.
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, at-
tempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting
to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggra-
vated burglary.
(B) Regardless of whether one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in
division (A) of this section is specified in the indictment and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when, con-
sidering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and
condition of the offender, one or more of the following is established by a [prepon-
derance] of the evidence:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the
fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or
mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the de-
fense of insanity.
121. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (B) (1975 Repl. Vol.).
122. The three factors are that: (1) the victim induced or facilitated in the offense; (2) the
defendant was under duress, coercion or strong provocation; or (3) the crime was the product of
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tionally, although the statute provided for a bifurcated trial,12 3 there was no
provision for immediate appellate review.
By the Court's own admission, the states had been required to "revise
their death penalty statutes in response to the various opinions supporting
judgments in Furman . . . and Gregg . . . and its companion cases .. 124
In an attempt to clarify the state of the law, which admittedly had not "al-
ways been easy to decipher," 125 the Court launched into a long discussion
regarding the judgment, with myriad distinctions concerning the philosophi-
cal rationales behind the reasons given for reversal.
The factual situation merely added to the confusion and lack of concensus
on the part of the justices. The defendant, Sandra Lockett, was convicted of
,murder with aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed
for the purpose of escaping punishment and (2) it was committed during
an armed robbery. 126  The defendant herself did not participate in the rob-
bery, but was driving the "getaway car." 127 The "triggerman" pleaded
guilty to the offense of aggravated murder, 2 8 thereby eliminating the possi-
bility of the death penalty for himself. He then testified against Lockett at
her trial.12 9
Seven justices agreed that jLockett's death sentence should be reversed.
The plurality opinion, which was delivered by Chief Justice Burger and
joined by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, invalidated the Ohio stat-
ute. The opinion was based on the fact that the defendant was not given an
opportunity to present as mitigating factors any aspect of her character or
a mental deficiency but it was insufficient to establish the defense of insanity. Each of these
factors, if they were present to a sufficient degree, would provide a defense to the crime.
Therefore, they are really just opportunities for the defense to argue "comparative culpability."
That is, if the defenses of self-defense, duress and insanity are not sufficient to raise a reason-
able doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, they can be used as a mitigation argument. This
does nothing for the accused who has been convicted, but did not have one of these defenses
available to him.
123. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03. The system does not actually set a second trial
for the issue of death unless one of the special aggravating factors has been alleged in the
indictment and specifically found to be present at the trial determining guilt.
124. 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2963 (1978).
125.. id.
126. 98 S. Ct. at 2957.
127. Id. The principal accused was a man named Parker, who allegedly shot the victim.
Lockett claimed that she thought her brother and Parker were merely going to pawn a ring, and
that she had not waited in the car but had gone to a restaurant to wait for them. 98 S. Ct. at
2958. See Note, Liability of an Aider and Abettor for Aggravated Murder in Ohio: State v.
Lockett, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 214 (1978), for an article specifically discussing the Ohio Supreme
Court's treatment of Lockett with particular emphasis on the "intent" requirement in murder
and the subsequent interpretation that the death penalty applies to the act. See also Note,
Criminal Law-Constitutional Law-Death Penalty-Evidence-Intent of an Aider and Abet-
tor to Commit Felony Murder May be Presumed from a Conspiracy to Commit the Accompany-
ing Felony-State v. Lockett, 46 U. CN. L. REV. 630 (1977).




record which conceivably could be considered for the imposition of a sen-
tence other than death. 130
Justice Blackmun agreed that Lockett should not have to suffer the death
penalty, but his rationale was that she should not die because she had not
taken a life. He stressed that he was not espousing a proportionality theory,
but merely stated that the sentencer should have discretion to consider the
degree of the defendant's participation in acts leading to the homocide and
the character of the defendant's mens rea.l 3 l
Justice Marshall reiterated his dissatisfaction with the death penalty and
would have found it per se unconstitutional. He also argued that, since the
law failed to provide for the consideration of the individual characteristics
pertaining to each defendant, it was virtually a mandatory sentencing stat-
ute.13 2  Justice White, on the other hand, concurred in the judgment be-
cause he believed the statute to be disproportionate to the crime, since it
did not allow for consideration of whether the defendant had the spe-
cific intent to commit murder.13 3 The sole dissent was written by Justice
Rehnquist who argued that the liberal construction given by the Court to
the interpretation of Furman and Gregg "will not guide sentencing discre-
tion, but will totally unleash it." 134
It is readily apparent that Lockett further refined the Court's search for a
viable standard by which to judge death penalty cases. The diversity of opin-
ion as to why the penalty should not be imposed under certain cir-
cumstances, however, leaves the door open to wide interpretation regarding
the future of the law in this area.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE THEMES UNDERLYING
THE RECENT DECISIONS
Several major themes run through the Supreme Court's recent decisions
regarding capital punishment. Although Lockett attempted to give states
"the clearest guidance that the Court can provide" 135 with regard to the
death penalty, it did so with no less than three concurring opinions supple-
130. 98 S. Ct. at 2957. For a near prophetic analysis of the interpretation that the Supreme
Court made in Lockett, see Comment, Capital Punishment In Ohio: The Constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Statute, 3 U. DAYTON L. REV. 169 (1978). The author states that "[t]he number
of mitigating circumstances considered in the Ohio capital sentencing procedure will no doubt
be addressed [by the Supreme Court in State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556
(1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978)]. The Ohio statute
appears to fall closer on the continuum to the statutes the Court has already found unconstitu-
tional, than to those which have been upheld." Id. at 195.
131. 98 S. Ct. at 2970. He advanced a second ground for reversal, based on the defendant's
assertion that the death penalty was an unnecessary burden on her right to a jury trial and
consequently a violation of her due process rights under the fourth and fifteenth amendments.
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
132. __U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2972 (1978).
133. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2981, 2982 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
134. 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2975 (1978).
135. id. at 2963.
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menting the plurality decision. In fact, Furman, Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek,
Woodson, and Roberts (Stanislaus) were all plurality opinions. 136 Con-
sequently, factual situations which could lead to invalidations of death pen-
alty statutes cannot be supported by a consistent rationale from any given
decision. This plethora of viewpoints regarding capital punishment indicates
that each supporting rationale continues to enjoy substantial viability. There-
fore, it is extremely important that these underlying themes be analyzed in
light of their relative authoritativeness.
These themes incorporate to an extent the earlier eighth amendment
"cruel and unusual" rationales. They can be categorized into three general
topics: (1) public opinion; (2) retribution and deterrence; and (3) arbitrariness
and capriciousness. Public opinion is obviously similar to the tests for "cruel
and unusual," but it also includes the concept of inherent excessiveness.
Retribution and deterrence includes a refinement of the definition of the
eighth amendment idea of human dignity in addition to the excessiveness
test. The rationale of arbitrariness is the newest concept in the area of capi-
tal punishment. It includes the idea of inherent cruelty or a per se ruling
concerning the death penalty and encompasses the Court's solution to this
problem through the use of guided discretion statutes.
Public Opinion
The Supreme Court only recently has found public opinion to be a key
factor 137 when determining the constitutionality of capital punishment. As in
the cases prior to Furman, the Court has justified its decisions by looking at
history, contemporary values, and "enlightened values."
Consideration of historical usage has been employed to argue both sides of
the constitutional argument. It has been used to justify upholding the death
penalty by focusing on the Framers' intent at the time of the adoption of the
eighth amendment.' 1 8  This argument maintains that when the eighth
amendment is construed with the fifth amendment, 139 which was enacted
at the same time, it could not have been intended as a ban on capital
136. See, e.g., id., in which the Court, discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Proffitt v. Fla., 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. N.C.,
428 U.S. 280 (1976): and Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), states
that "[hience, the disposition of each case varied according to the votes of a pluraltiy of three
Justices who delivered a joint opinion in each of the five cases .... "
137. For a discussion of public opinion and the death penalty from a sociological standpoint,
see Thomas, Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Death Penalty: The Relevance of Informed
Public Opinion, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1005 (1977). See generally Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion,
The Death Penalty and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L.
REV. 171; Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1245
(1974).
138. "[W]hatever punishments the Framers of the Constitution may have intended to pro-
hibit under the 'cruel and unusual' language, there cannot be the slightest doubt that they
intended no absolute bar on the Government's authority to impose the death penalty." Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 419 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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punishment. This is evident from the fact that the fifth amendment guaran-
teed those charged with crimes that the prosecution would have a single
opportunity to seek imposition of the death penalty, and that death could
only be exacted in accordance with due process and a grand jury indict-
ment. 140 Therefore, the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment was to be interpreted as forbidding some punishments,
but not death. Also, the death penalty had long been accepted in both Eng-
land and the United States. 14 1 The Court noted further that this reliance on
history was consistent with previous decisions in which the death penalty
was held not to be invalid per se.
142
In contrast, the "history" rationale has been advanced to support the posi-
tion of those that would hold the death penalty unconstitutional. It has been
argued that the interpretation of cases reflecting the implicit validation of
capital punishment was in actuality a restraint upon the legislature. 143  The
argument has also been made that the Framers' intent was to insert the
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause as a judicial check on the legisla-
ture.' 4 4  In support of this argument, the proponents rely on a statement
made at the First Congress by Representative Livermore, who objected to
the proposed eighth amendment because "it is sometimes necessary to hang
a man . . . but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these
punishments because they are cruel." 145 Congress' apparent disregard of
Livermore's statement demonstrated that the Framers were prepared to run
the risk that punishments like hanging a man to death would be prohibited
in the future.. 4 6  This argument met with success in Coker when the Court
asserted that a majority of states had not authorized death as a punishment
for rape during the past fifty years. 147 Thus, history has been used to justify
both upholding and invalidating the death penalty.
148
140. 408 U.S. 238, 419 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). See Polsby, supra note 57; Comment,
You May Kill, But You Must Promise Not To Use Discretion: Furman v. Georgia, 6 Loy. L.
A.L. REV. 506, 550-51 (1973).
141. The Gregg plurality adopted the dissenters' position in Furman.
142. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976).
143. Id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. 408 U.S. 238, 274-75 n.17 (1972) (Brennan J., concurring).
145. Id. at 262-63.
146. However, it could also be argued that Congress did not think the protests were worth
commenting on, see Comment, You May Kill, But You Must Promise Not to Use Discre-
tion: Furman v. Georgia, supra note 140.
147. 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977). In 1925, eighteen states, the District of Columbia and the
Federal Government authorized the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman. Id. See also
Bye, Recent History and Present Status of Capital Punishment in the United States, 17 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLocY 234, 241-42 (1926). In 1971, prior to the Furman decision, sixteen states
and the federal government authorized capital punishment for the rape of an adult female. 433
U.S. at 593.
Rape statutes authorizing the death penalty may undergo revisions in the future because
there is a present movement for legislative reform of the rape laws. See Note, Rape Reform
Legislation: Is It the Solution?, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 463 (1975).
148. Another criticism of the use of "historical usage" as a meaningful criterion is that accep-
tance of the status quo of our society may or may not indicate conformity with the Constitution.
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In addition to a purely historical analysis to determine public opinion, the
Supreme Court has used "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society" as a key element in determining capital
punishment cases.' 4 9 The Court has looked basically to the will of the legis-
lature and jury sentencing decisions to determine these contemporary
values. 150 The contention has been that the most accurate reflection of soci-
ety's attitudes towards punishment is to be found in its legislative enact-
ments. In Furman, the dissenters noted that the laws of forty states, the
District of Columbia and the federal government continued to allow the
death penalty. 15 1 In further support, it was noted that many of these stat-
utes recently had been passed by resounding majorities, and that in the last
fourteen years, three states had voted to restore or continue the death pen-
alty.
In Gregg, the Court also measured contemporary values by the will of the
legislature. It stated that many Americans continue to regard capital
punishment as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction. 1 52  The plu-
rality demonstrated this legislative preference by noting that, after Furman,
at least thirty-five states enacted new statutes which prescribed the death
penalty for at least some crimes resulting in the death of another person. 153
Therefore, it is clear that capital punishment itself has not been rejected by
the elective representatives of the people. 1 54  It is significant to note,
though, that the Gregg consideration of the "contemporary values" of the
people as reflected by the state legislature was not taken into account when
the Supreme Court invalidated the mandatory statutes. If the Gregg ap-
proach had been used, the state legislatures' decision that a certain category
of offenders should die would not have been ruled unconstitutional.
In Coker, the Court used the Gregg analysis of legislative action to hold
that capital punishment for rape was cruel and unusual per se.' 55  It noted
that -after Furman no state which had not previously authorized death for
rape chose to include rape among capital felonies. 156 This same argument,
The Court has struck down "historical" practices such as school segregation and voting malap-
portionment as unconstitutional.
149. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
150. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594-96 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81
(1976).
151. 408 U.S. 238, 383-84, 417, 437-39 (1972).
152. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976).
153. Id. at 179-80.
154. Id. at 180-81. With regard to the "popularity" of the death penalty, as reflected by
thirty-five states having reenacted capital laws, the Furman court failed to acknowledge that, of
the 35 states, only California had not had the death penalty prior to Furman. CAL. PENAL
(CODE §§ 190.1, 209, 219 (West Supp. 1976). This reenactment of capital laws may indicate an
effort to conform to the new constitutional requirements.
155. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
156. Id. at 595-96.
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however, could have been made in Gregg because only one new state
enacted the death penalty after Furman. Instead, the Gregg Court only
cited arguments which would enhance public support of capital punish-
ment.1 5 7  Likewise, the Court could have stated in Coker that during the
last fifty years sixteen states held rape to be a capital offense. The Court,
though, attempted to whittle down the statistics for the number of states
preferring capital punishment for rape by further categorizing the crime.1 5 8
In further support for its contention that legislatures did not prefer the death
penalty for rape, the Court noted that Louisiana and North Carolina omitted
rape from their revised capital punishment statutes. 159 Again, it failed to
consider the fact that after Furman there was much confusion as to whether
the death penalty itself, even for murder, was constitutional. 160
In addition to measuring contemporary values by legislative action, the
Supreme Court' also has assessed these values by evaluating jury determina-
tions. 61 It has been asserted that the fact that jurors impose the death
penalty as rarely as they do demonstrates a nearly absolute rejection of
it. 162 In assessing the juries' attitudes in Coker, the Court reviewed the
jury sentencing decisions only in the state of Georgia to show that, in at
least nine out of ten rape cases, juries had not imposed the death sen-
tence.1 6 3  But on a larger statistical basis, it has been asserted that jurors
who reflect "the conscience of the community" continue to impose the death
penalty at a rate of twice a week.' 6 4 This counterargument bases its con-
clusion on the :results of jury decisions in many states.1 65 But even if statis-
tically there are infrequent jury verdicts imposing the death penalty, this
157. See note 1.54 and accompanying text supra.
158. For example, the Court stated that of the post-Furman statutes only three authorized
the death penalty for rape of an adult woman. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977). The
Coker court failed to acknowledge that three others authorized the death penalty for rape of a child.
The Court also noted that two of the three statutes providing for rape of an adult woman were
invalidated. Id. It failed to mention, however, that this invalidation was by Supreme Court
preference-not legislative preference.
159. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977).
160. Perhaps L:)uisiana and North Carolina, in attempting to conform to the Constitution,
decided that it would no longer be safe to include rape because even the inclusion of murder
might be invalidated. Now that their mandatory approach has been invalidated, they may take a
very conservative stance in passing future legislation..
161. Apparently, the Supreme Court uses this criterion as a -measure of public opinion be-
cause it believes that juries reflect community viewpoints, and the frequency or infrequency
with which the death penalty is imposed reflects whether or not the punishment is favorable to
the public.
162. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
163. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
164. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 441 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
165. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976).
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does not necessarily indicate a rejection of capital punishment. The reluc-
tance may be due to the juries' human feelings that the death penalty should
be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.' 66 Contending that jury
behavior reflects social acceptance of the death penalty, the Court in Gregg
observed that at the end of 1974, approximately 254 persons had been sen-
tenced to death since Furman and by the end of March, 1976, more than 460
persons had been given the death penalty.167 The argument then seems to
turn on the characterization of the data and upon second guessing the
thought processes of the jury. Thus, the argument of "contemporary values"
appears to represent a less than consistent analysis regarding its use to de-
termine the public's opinion regarding capital punishment.
A third possible approach was used by the Court in Furman. Justice Mar-
shall suggested that public opinion for purposes of defining the boundaries of
the eighth amendment could be identified by examining "enlightened"
standards of decency. He argued that there was really no accurate means to
determine what people actually think, noting that the community's attitude
"resembles a slithery shadow, since one can seldom learn, at all accurately,
what the community, or a majority, actually feels. Even a carefully taken
'public opinion poll' would be inconclusive in a case like this." 168  Moreover,
even if public opinion could be accurately assessed, he asserted that the
issue was not whether a substantial proportion of Americans would think that
capital punishment was barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to
be so in light of all information presently available. Thus, it was concluded
166. Id. The contrary argument in Furman was that the infrequency of the death penalty
resulted in capriciousness. Justice Brennan noted that there could be no real distinction be-
tween the trivial number who were executed and the vast number of those imprisoned. "When
a country of over 200 million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50
times a year, the inference is strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly
applied." Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). In contrast to this position, Chief Justice Burger
advanced the argument that rarity is not necessarily capriciousness. Judges and juries may be
cautious to err on the side of mercy and "to assume from the mere fact of relative infrequency
that only a random assortment of pariahs are sentenced to death is to cast grave doubts on the
basic integrity of our jury system." Id. at 389 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, the judiciary
has at other times expressed its faith in the capabilities and responsibleness of jurors as con-
scientious decision makers. Justice Harlan wrote, in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971), with the concurrence of Justices White and Stewart:
States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome respon-
sibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the con-
sequences of their decision .... In light of history, experience and the present
limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing
to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in
capital cases is offensive to the Constitution.
Id. at 207-08 (Harlan, J., concurring).
167. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976). Even though juries have sent more persons
to death after Furman, thirty-five states have changed their laws so it would be difficult to
accurately assess jury attitudes regarding capital punishment before and after Furman.
168. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), quoting United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
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that, if the public had an opportunity to peruse the data which he had amas-
sed, they would opt for his position. This opinion raises the important point
of whether public opinion can ever be accurately assessed. The Court has
relied on enactments by the legislature and results of jury sentencing as
reflective of contemporary community values. These criteria, however, can
and have been compiled to argue for either invalidating or upholding a par-
ticular statute. 16E,
Retribution and Deterrence
Although the notion of human dignity had often been referred to in the
eighth amendment opinions, it had not been articulated as an actual test
until Furman. 170 The test attempted to define human dignity based on an
analysis of retribution and deterrence. It was asserted that a sanction was
unconstitutionally excessive if there was available a significantly less severe
punishment adequate to achieve the purpose for which the initial sanction
was inflicted. 171  It was argued that death was an excessive punishment in
terms of the goal of retribution because the overwhelming number of crimi-
nals who are prosecuted for capital crimes go to prison and prison, therefore,
serves the retributive purpose for society. 1 72  In support of the argument
that the death penalty should be abolished, it has been asserted that
punishments as retribution have been condemned by scholars for centuries,
and the eighth amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from
becoming synonymous with vengeance. 1 73  If retribution alone could serve
169. In Gregg, the Court also cited a state referendum, and the Harris and Gallup polls to
lend credibility to the Court's contention. However, it may be that the Court has overlooked
some additional means of assessing public opinion on whether or not capital punishment should
be abolished. One commentator has noted the extremely difficult task of accurately evaluating
public opinion:
What is this concensus? Is it qualitative or quantitative? Is it nationwide or broken
into statewide segments? If nationwide, is it determined by a majority of states or a
majority of people? What is it a consensus of? Abstract notions of fair play and
justice? Or an opinion on the third degree, or flag-saluting, or racial segregation?
Or an opinion on the given case before the Court? And how does a justice, who
knows what he is looking for, find it? By a Gallup Poll? By editorials in leading
papers? By the number of committees of substantial citizens who support the no-
tion? By the number of briefs amici curiae filed? By the number of states which
follow a given course?
Branden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 584-85 (1948).
170. Justice Brennan adopted the phrase originally stated in Trop and incorporated it into a
four part test to determine whether a challenged punishment is unconstitutionally "cruel and
unusual." The four principles operate to integrate the "human dignity" concept with a consider-
ation of other recognized guidelines. They are: (1) a punishment must not be so severe as to be
degrading to the dignity of a human being; (2) the government must not arbitrarily inflict a
severe punishment; (3) a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society;
and (4) a severe punishment must not be excessive or unnecessary. Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 279-80 (Brennan, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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as a justification for any particular penalty, the limit of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause would depend entirely upon the degree of public out-
rage prompted by the crime. 174  If this were so, "the language would be




It also has been argued, however, that retribution is essential in an or-
dered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than
self-help to vindicate their wrongs. 176  Therefore, "the decision that capital
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expres-
sion of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous
an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty
of death." 177
In addition to retribution, the use of capital punishment to accomplish the
purpose of deterrence was also examined in Furman. It was argued that the
theory that criminals are deterred by the threat of the death penalty assumes
that a criminal thinks so rationally about the commission of capital crimes
that he not only considers the risk of punishment, but also distinguishes
between two possible punishments so precisely that he will be willing to risk
long-term imprisonment and not capital punishment. This assumption is
further weakened when one considers that "[t]he risk of death is remote and
improbable; in contrast, the risk of long-term imprisonment is near and
great." 178
The effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent was analyzed using
an empirical approach. It was reasoned that, if the death penalty really de-
terred prospective murderers, then murders should be committed less fre-
quently in states where the death penalty had been retained than in states
which had abolished it, assuming that other factors such as the character of
the population and economic conditions were equal. 179  Justice Marshall ex-
tensively documented his conclusion that this proposition was inaccurate-at
least under his suppositions. He concluded that there was no correlation
between the murder rate and the presence or absence of the capital sanc-
tion. l8 0 Furthermore, the abolition and/or reintroduction of the death pen-
alty had no effect on the homicide rates of the various states involved.' 8 '
In Gregg, the deterrent effect of capital punishment was dismissed as in-
conclusive. In so doing, the Gregg Court noted the conflicting conclusions
reached in the numerous empirical studies done on the deterrent effect of
capital punishment. 1 82 The plurality then made a seemingly intuitive argu-
ment:
174. See Comment, You May Kill, But You Must Promise Not To Use Discretion: Furman v.
Georgia, supra note 140.
175. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
176. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
177. Id. at 184.
178. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 302 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 349 (Marshall, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 350 (Marshall, J., concurring).
181. Id.
182. A significant number of studies have been done on the deterrent effect of capital
punishment. See, e.g., HooK, THE DEATH SENTENCE, IN THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
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[F]or many murderers, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant de-
terrent. There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for
hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold
calculus that precedes the decision to act. And there are some categories
of murder, such as murder by a life prisoner, where other sanctions may
not be adequate.
18 3
The Court also applied judicial restraint, asserting that the resolution of such
complex factual issues rests with the legislature. 184 The plurality's seem-
ingly intuitive argument can be compared with Justice Brennan's argument
in Furman. The Gregg Court argued that murderers are careful, rational
planners who will consider the death penalty. Justice Brennan argued the
opposite hypothesis. Since neither theory was supported by empirical evi-
dence, it is difficult to assess which viewpoint was correct.
l8 5
The other aspect of the human dignity rationale is that the punishment
should not be excessive. This argument was used to advance the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty as per se constitutional. It was used also to
invalidate the punishment of death for rape in Coker. 18 6  Most recently, it
146 (H. Bedau ed. 1.967); T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL
CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1959); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397 (June 1975) [here-
inafter cited as Ehrlich].
The conclusions reached in these studies conflict. For example, one study compared the
homicide rates of states which had the death penalty with states which did not. The conclusion
reached was that variations in the rates appear to have taken place in the same way, regardless
of the presence or absence of capital punishment law codes. Homicide rates were also examined
before and after capital punishment was abolished within a particular state. Again, no significant
change in rates occurred. T. SELLIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1967). The Ehrlich study con-
cluded that the death penalty has a significant deterrent effect. This study was based on the use
of a sophisticated econometric model instead of the statistical techniques used in earlier studies.
Ehrlich, supra, at 397. The Ehrlich study has been criticized by commentators. See Peck, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L. J. 359 (1976).
However, all available deterrent studies can be criticized because deterrence is extremely dif-
ficult to measure. One commentator convincingly argued:
No one knows how many persons chose not to commit a crime because of capital
punishment. Some studies tend to focus on the motivations of those who have vio-
lated the law; other studies compare the rates of crime in various situations. Aside
from the many theoretical problems which tend to undermine the validity of these
studies, a distinctive weakness lies in their inability to bridge the remote distance
between capital punishment in law codes and a criminal decision made by an indi-
vidual. Also, diversions in the criminal process which intervene between criminal
behavior and the imposition of death are so numerous that measurement of correla- /
tions between the death sentence and its import on criminal conduct seems un-
realistic.
Tao, Beyond Furman v. Georgia: The Need for a Morally Based Decision on Capital Punish-
ment, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 722, 736 (1976).
183. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976).
184. Id.
185. Additionally, there is no clear reason why the Court assessed respect for human dignity
only in terms of deterrence and retribution. One may wonder why the emphasis on human
attitudes considered the concept of retribution and not rehabilitation.
186. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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was used in Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Lockett.18 7 There the
excessiveness test was used to support the argument that the punishment
under an accountability theory would be inherently excessive. In the opinion
of the Court, punishment was to be considered excessive if mitigating factors
were not permitted to be utilized. 188 The Court, however, specifically re-
served deciding the question of whether some specific crimes might be so
heinous that the punishment of death would be the only deterrent, and ac-
cordingly would not be excessive. 189 This point is significant in that it will
most probably be the next factual situation to be presented before the Su-
preme Court. Therefore, this rationale is still viable and may well be utilized
in future cases.
Arbitrariness and Capriciousness
The major issue in Furman was the arbitrary manner in which capital
punishment was being administered. It was observed that there was a statis-
tical correlation between the decline in the number of executions and the
then current increase in capital crimes. Consequently, it was argued that
death, only inflicted in a "trivial number of cases", was not the usual
punishment for any crime. 190 Additionally, it was noted that Furman was
guilty of an "accidental" felony murder, and it was felt that his crime could
not be classified among the hundred most vicious in any given year.191 This
situation indicated that the probability of arbitrary punishment was suffi-
ciently substantial. It was also argued that it was "cruel and unusual" in that
the petitioner was capriciously selected to receive the death sentence in a
187. 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2972 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring). It was argued that, even if the
Court would not accept capital punishment as per se unconstitutional, the Ohio statute failed to con-
sider any "distinction between a wilful and malicious murderer and an accomplice to an armed
robbery in which a killing intentionally occurs." Id. Justice Marshall expresses his grave dissatis-
faction with the law by stating: "[t]he Ohio statute, with its blunderbuss virtually mandatory
approach to imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes, wholly fails to recognize the
unique individuality of every criminal defendant who comes before its courts." Id. at 2973
(Marshall, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 2965. The Court stated that:
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different
from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized deci-
sion is essential in capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in a capital
case with the degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more
important than in noncapital cases.
id.
189. The Court hedges on the ultimate perimeters by stating that "we conclude that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of
capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defend-
ant's character or record . I..." d  at 98 S. Ct. at 2965 (emphasis added).
190. 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Because of this, it was inferred that
in those few cases imposing death, the punishment was not being justly applied and therefore
was "cruel and unusual."
191. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294-95 n.48 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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manner similar to his "being struck by lightning.' 192  This arbitrariness was
apparently due to the unguided discretion given to the juries. 193
It is important to analyze whether, assuming the majority was correct in
its determination that capital punishment was being administered arbitrarily,
the new guided discretion standards will eliminate the problem. The bifur-
cated approach, which provides for statutory guidelines of a consideration of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, appears to force the jury to con-
sider important facts that they might not otherwise have considered. Also,
the preference for a separate sentencing hearing was based on the need to
have information relevant to sentencing which might be prejudicial on the
issue of guilt. 194 Mandatory appellate review in all cases where death may
be imposed also appears to be an effective safeguard against the arbitrary
infliction of capital punishment. 1 95
In addition to the selective imposition of punishment, arbitrariness has
also been found to be the result of discriminatory application of the law. In
Furman, Justice Douglas found that the death penalty was being adminis-
tered capriciously, but his reasoning was based on class and especially racial
discrimination. He argued that it was "cruel and unusual" to apply the death
192. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stressed the infrequency with which
death was administered. He believed that the practice of vesting sentencing authority in juries,
in order to mitigate the law through community involvement, has encouraged excessive jury
leniency, resulting in juries' refusal to order the death penalty.
194. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191-92 (1976). However, if a consideration of individual
factors regarding the particular crime and defendant are so important, the Jurek Court was
remarkably tolerant in evaluating Texas' standard, which did not require the consideration of
mitigating circumstances but allowed them to be "brought in." Id. at 272. In Lockett, the Court
distinguished the Jurek decision, stating that "the statute survived the petitioner's Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment attack because three Justices concluded that the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals had broadly interpreted the second question ... (whether there was a probability
that the defendant would be a continuing threat to society] despite its facial narrowniess-so as
to permit the sentencer to consider whatever mitigating circumstances the defendant might be
able to show." 98 S. Ct. 2594, 2966 (1978).
195. In Georgia, for example, the state supreme court must decide whether each sentence is
excessive in relation to the penalties imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 205 (1976). The Court noted its approval of
Georgia's system by asserting that the appellate review substantially eliminated the possibility
that a person would be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. Id. at 206. But see
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), in which the Court explicitly rejected the conten-
tion that due process requires sentencing standards or bifurcated procedures in capital cases:
The States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome
responsibility of decreeing death .. .will consider a variety of factors, many of
which will have been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments of defense
counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area
could inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of cir-
cumstances would ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases and facets
to each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boiler plate' or a
statement of the obvious that no jury would need.
Id. at 207-08.
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penalty only to a minority of persons who are outcasts of society and who
society was willing to see suffer. 196  Thus, he regarded the sentencing pro-
cess as not merely arbitrary but invidiously discriminatory. 197 Although the
Supreme Court held that the selective arbitrariness found in Furman could
be remedied by the guided discretion statutes, it never again discussed the
question of invidious discrimination.
The Court has admitted that a mandatory or extremely restricted statute
would indeed limit arbitrariness,1 98 but in Lockett it held that the imposition
of death without "consideration of relevant mitigating factors" 199 would be
unconstitutional. The Court's main emphasis was that the statute must give
the defendant an opportunity to present extenuating and mitigating cir-
cumstances. It stated that "[t]he limited range of mitigating circumstances
which may be considered by the sentencer under the Ohio statute [was]
incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 20 0 It was ar-
gued, however, in both a concurring 20 1 and the dissenting opinion, 202 that
in reality the Lockett decision does not limit arbitrariness. Rather, it was
contended, by requiring the states to allow a defendant to submit evidence
of almost any conceivable extenuating circumstance, the Court is returning
to pre-Furman standards. Now the sentencer can impose the death penalty
"only as an exercise of his unguided discretion after being presented with all
circumstances which the defendant might believe to be conceivably relevant
to the appropriateness of the penalty for the individual offender." 20 3  It was
feared that this result would return the sentencing procedure back to the
situation where death was reserved only for those very few for whom society
had the least consideration. 20 4
196. 408 U.S. 238, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas cited noted opinions of
former Warden Lawes of Sing Sing and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the effect
that a poor defendant is far more likely to be sentenced to death than a rich one. Id. at 251.
197. In contrast, Justice Burger argued that such racial discrimination is a product of the
distant past. Justice Burger's argument is questionable since some studies do indicate that, in
some states, race appears to be a factor in post-conviction dispositions of recent capital punish-
ment cases. See, e.g., Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Com-
muted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CuN. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 301, 305-06 (1972);
Bedeau, Death Sentences in New Jersey, 1.907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1964); Note,
Capital Punishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L. REV. 97, 112-16 (1972).
198. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
199. 98 S. Ct. 2594, 2967 (1978).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2982 (White, J., concurring).
202. "By encouraging defendants in capital cases, and presumably sentencing judges and
juries, to take into consideration anything under the sun as a 'mitigating circumstance,' it will
not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it." id. at 2975 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
203. id. at 2982 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
204. Justice White stated that:
I greatly fear that the effect of the Court's decision today will be to constitutionally
compel a restoration of the state of -affairs at the time Furman was decided, where
the death penalty is imposed so erratically and the threat of execution is so at-
tenuated for even the most atrocious murders ...that it would be ineffective.
Id. at 2982 (White, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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This is obviously the most authoritative statement regarding the death
penalty. The gist of these decisions seems to be that arbitrariness can be
eliminated if juries are guided in their discretion by the proscriptions of the
Supreme Court. The guided discretion statutes, however, remain an evolv-
ing, shadowy concept. The Court has yet to uniformly and permanently ar-
ticulate exactly what standards will eliminate the constitutional infirmity.
CONCLUSION
In the past six years, the Supreme Court has made a concerted effort to
present the states with guidelines for acceptable standards for imposition of
the death penalty. Although the Court has made a number of rulings on the
subject, no comprehensive theory regarding the reasoning or tests to be
used when making such determinations has emerged. The Court's significant
effort in this area unfortunately has failed to provide the needed direction.
The standards recently articulated include the concepts of public opinion,
human dignity and arbitrariness. The public opinion arguments generally
were based on statistical evidence or a subjective reading of the motivation
of juries across the nation, and have been employed by both opponents and
proponents of the death penalty. The human dignity standards of retribu-
tion, deterrence and excessiveness suffer the same malady. In addition, the
term "human dignity" has suffered various inexplicable permutations.2 0 5 The
concept of arbitrariness has been given the greatest number of specific
guidelines, but it is still vague and uncertain as to what will qualify as a
constitutionally acceptable guided discretion statute. It is also unclear, in
light of the Court's admission that mandatory death sentencing statutes may
be permissible for certain types of criminals, whether this standard is always
necessary. 206
These problems are significantly complicated by the fact that there has not
been a single majority opinion which clearly articulates and establishes
specific guidelines. Consequently, all arguments presently advanced by con-
curring and even dissenting opinions must be considered viable and au-
thoritative. A change in the composition of the Court or a particularly sensi-
tive factual situation could upset the delicate balance established thus far and
completely re-direct the Court's emphasis. Perhaps at this level of social
science, objective criteria cannot be a truly effective measure and the
Supreme Court, therefore, has no other choice but to rely on the subjective
approach. If this is the case, the Court has a grave moral responsibility to
205. For example, Justice Brennan in Furman borrowed the notion of human dignity from
Trop and incorporated it into his own test. In Gregg, the plurality used the concept of human
dignity but altered its meaning once more. See note 170 and accompanying text supra.
206. -. U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978). The Court refused to express an opinion
regarding the necessity of a deterrent effect for certain types of crimes. Thus the possibility of
an acceptable, mandatory sentencing statute is still viable. Id. at 2965 n.11.
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articulate a clear, definitive standard to use when evaluating the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty and to apply that standard on a consistent
basis. The decision of whether or not to take a human being's life deserves
such attention.
Lynn Kristine Mitchell
Grace E. Wein
